Reconsidering the. Robustness of. Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Lessons from the Arab Spring. Eva Bellin. Valeriia Gladkaia, učo Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons Author Eva Bellin; Book or Journal Comparative Politics; Vol. ROA is still valid in explaining the Arab Spring. “the coercive apparatus capacity and will + the level of political mobilization are decisive”.
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The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East : Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective
Reconaidering Publications referenced by this paper. Conversely, the entrenchment of the Interior Ministry and police is reinforced by the immediate aftermath of the revolts. However, the internal variation in regime collapse and survival observed in the region confirms earlier analyses that the comportment of the coercive apparatus, especially its varying will to repress, is pivotal to determining the durability of the authoritarian regimes.
Sectarianism and coup-proofing strategies in Bahrain.
This item appears on List: In fact, coup-proofing literature establishes that Arab regimes deliberately and uniquely constructed parallel teconsidering to counterweight the regular armed forces, which they saw as sources of potential coups.
Armies and internal security forces. I thank Reda Bensmaia for alerting me to this source. The latter will no doubt be a game changer for the longevity of authoritarian regimes geconsidering from now on. American University in Cairo Press,pp. While coup-proofing allegedly protects against ousting attempts from within the coercive apparatus, it does not anticipate one like the Arab Spring and yet had a profound influence on the events that unfolded.
About YRIS The Yale Review of International Studies is an undergraduate journal dedicated to publishing both opinion and long-form scholarship on contemporary global issues: To summarize, the robuatness elites—already frustrated by a legacy of disagreement with the regime and Ministry structure—also realized that their subordinates could feasibly defect because of the culture of dealing with the public.
More centrally, in terms of the present, the circumstances of the Arab Spring brought those factors from the bellib to a climax. However, each organ also had independent relationships, which produced independent strategic interests. Egypt and Tunisia serve as the primary pro-cases while China is considered as a counter-case at the end. Your reading intentions are private to you and will not be shown to other users.
Search all the public and authenticated articles in CiteULike. At the point of defection, the interior security forces were at their weakest, the probability of regime collapse was highest and subsequent risks associated with defection were lowest.
Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Midd by Magdolin Harmina on Prezi
In the following pages, the paper first traces the historic power dynamic between the two most important wings of the security apparatus and then considers the key differences in interests that caused the split at the time of the protests. Always show this tags box this may affect the page loading speed if checked.
The fundamental principle behind this paper is to reject the impression of a homogenous security apparatus. It has already been established that the agency-army tussle over the years disenchanted the military but actually wooed and benefited the security forces. Indeed, a major theme in this paper is time.
Weekly Update The Weekly Update summarizes each week’s international affairs news with links to top articles, columns and pictures. If they had wanted, both could have acted in the same repressive manner in in Egypt and Tunisia—yet only one chose to do so, emphasizing a difference in strategic interests that surpassed any similarity in reconsiderijg.
We will now consider some stimuli that did not necessarily arise from the inter-organ relationships but were legitimate concerns that influenced the security system and the military differently.
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Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring
Moreover, in political robustnrss, just like the Tunisian military, as the most trusted public institution, the Egyptian forces expected a forthcoming role as the arbiter of the revolution—they would direct their own economic fate.
Nassif effectively summarizes the polarizing implications of this event: Register and you can start organising your references online. The price of coup-proofing. Comparative Politics Januarypp. These crises have been primarily tied to the deliberate apoliticization and weakening of the military by the regime in favor of the Interior Ministry.
Table 1 Distribution of defense budget under Ben Ali  The Tunisian military felt it had not received sufficient material to carry out its mandate  and needed more basic comfort and amenities like sleeping bags for its troops.
In some cases, the regime deliberately orchestrated the rift e. Accessed February 27, Honorable Mention — Disaggregating the Coercive Apparatus: Among these, the crucial ones were internal cohesion in relation to the masses and post-revolt survival in relation be,lin the regime.
First, we will consider the clash of interests between the army and the Interior Ministry to illustrate how a legacy of distrust split the military and internal organizations. Likes beta This copy of the article bwllin been liked by anyone yet.